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Multi-Factor Authentication through Integration with IMS System

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ABSTRACT

The main concern for the customers and the organizations to use services offered by Cloud computing providers is the confidentiality and security of the data stored using the sharable infrastructure. Customers also want to use the support provided by the service providers according to their application requirements, which leads to the configuration of the infrastructure provided to the customers as per their requirements.

Most of the cloud computing services provided are rigid and do not allow customers to make changes. Users have options to use Open source-based cloud computing systems such as OpenStack, but these platforms to suffer from various weaknesses especially exposing the vulnerabilities attacked. OpenStack open-source cloud computing systems are frequently being used by many users who want to build a cloud computing infrastructure on their own for either private or public purposes.

A dedicated component "Keystone" of OpenStack used for providing security to the resources provisioned and used by the users through processes that are related to authentication, authorization, access control and data security. Keystone uses Ferment Tokens for Authentication and Authorization which exposes much vulnerability. Many authentication systems are in use such as Active Directory System, Integrated Management System etc. The use of such order within the Cloud Computing Architecture helps to implement a high level of security to the user programs and Data.

Multi-Factor systems used for implementing high-level security which takes benefit of two authentication systems which are interconnected, while one system being native, the other could be an external authentication system such as ADDS or IMS. In this paper, a Multi-factor based authentication system implemented that focuses on integrating the "Keystone" based authentication system achieved within OpenStack, and Integrated identity Management System applied within the RED Hat Operating System.

Keywords: Open Source cloud computing, Open Stack, ADDS Authentication System, Federated authentication, Security enforcement within open Stack.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Authenticating System

Users register with a cloud computing system using the username name and password. The registration process sometimes involves the operation of a contract, which includes pricing, services required, response time, throughput, penalties, downtime provisions, limitations on the levels of assistance needed, etc.

Users start communicating with the identity service of a specific cloud computing system by keying in the user name and password. The identity service after validating and verifying the user will send a token, which is a formatted data string containing the details of the services availed, Token to be used for access to the services, Endpoints to start Accessing the services, projects to which the user belongs, etc. The user then uses the authentication token to start directly communicating with the services intended by the user. The general process used for authentication shown in Figure 1. The service component verifies the authenticity of the user after receiving the request from the user by contacting the authentication mechanism, and on getting confirmation, the service component authorizes the user to access the service.
The user first registers into the cloud computing systems and then logs into the identity services using user name and password, which after checking the authenticates the user by passing token used for accessing the service.



Figure 1: General Process Flow for authentication System

1.2 Multi-factor Authentication

Multi-factor authentication means implementing the process of authentication by using multiple mechanisms. For example, an authentication system in addition to ensuring the implementing authentication within itself but also further check the credentials of the users by checking with other kinds of authentication systems such as ADDS, Red Hat IMS, Free IPA, etc.

The multi-factor authentication helps to mitigate various kinds of attacks that include brute force, social engineering, spear, and mass phishing attacks, which generally attack the user names and passwords. There is a need to deploy third-party tools and integrate the same with the underlying authentication system built to recognize the users.

Administrators or Automated preinstalled software programs or users with admin or superuser access facility configure an application such that both native and external authentication systems used considering two or more authentication factors for securing a cloud computing system. The factors considered include digital signatures, digital certificates, encryption and decryption methods, etc. There has been well established external authentication that includes ADDS, IMS, which are the third party applications that implement different protocols for effecting authentication. Multi-factor Authentication reduces the risk massively while ensuring high security to the cloud computing system.

The identity service usually is designed to work with backbends used as plugins, which may use a further extension to the process of authentication. The Identify service configured to use one or more plugins so that the authentication system implemented using multiple factors. The process called a federated authentication system. Figure 2 shows the way the multi-factor authentication system works



Figure 2: Process Flow for Multi-Factor Authentication

1.3 Use of token

The token often passed as a specific structure containing the details of the services, resources that can be accessed, etc. The authentication token also provides a catalog of various services that a cloud computing system can offer — each service listed with its name, Access endpoints for internal, admin, and public access.

The token, once distributed, can be revoked by the system that made available the Token. Users can use API of the Identity service to revoke the tokens, get the list of revoked tokens, get the list of various services offered by the cloud computing system to the user who has access to the token, to remove the existing token — all queries related to the tokens initiated by the users or the services supported through API calls. The identify service provides API, which can be used for token management through operations such as token revocation, to list existing tokens, remove tokens, cache tokens, etc.

There are many types of taken management systems used in the literature, which include UUID, Fernet, PKI, PKIZ, JSON, etc. which differ from each other in many ways in terms of the content of those tokens and the way content in the token is secured. The token is the most venerable elements within the cloud computing system.

1.4 Authentication system as implemented in OpenStack

Open Stack is an open-source Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud computing software, where users can provision virtual machines by using its components such as storage (called “swift”), compute (called “nova”), etc. Figure 3 shows a high-level overview of Open Stack. Open Stack deployed in standard hardware and its resources like computation, networking, and storage shared in the cloud. These resources controlled using an Open Stack dashboard. Users can avail of these resources by using a client program such as an Internet browser. Open Stack has a modular architecture.

Open Stack is composed of a set of Modules that together deliver the functionality required by the user. Many modules are available, and each module provides a kind of service needed by the user. The functioning of the OPEN stack module individually attacked. To understand the extent to which an open stack is secured, each Module assessed to find the vulnerabilities and the level of security built into each of the Modules. The weaknesses of the OPEN STACK component that can be exploited by attackers must be known to make the Modules secured from attacking through the implementation of counter-attacking mechanisms. The Security enforcement under open Stack recognized in terms of authorization, authentication access control, and data security.

The authorization and authentication service and the access control archived through KEYSTONE Module. KEYSTONE Module handles all the issues related to the identification of the users. Virtual Images managed through GLANCE Module, but the security of virtual images handled through

SWIFT, which stores all the VM images and security of which is dealt with by it.

Data in Open Stack managed through three distinct modules that include SWIFT (Object Storage), CINDER (Block Storage), Trove (Relational Databases), Regular applications use a database, and therefore, the use of Trove done extensively. Securing when TROVE used is the Major Issue. A certain level of enforcement of security done within these modules

One of the most important issues connected with the security is identifying the users, group of users, and their roles and privileges that the users have in availing the resources. The Module KEYSTONE provides the Identity services to all the other modules in Open Stack. The security issue is very much related to identifying the users and the rights that are granted to those users, such that the users provided with access to the resources for which permissions granted.

Keystone is a component of Open Stack that handles the issue of authenticating the users to have access to different services. Keystone implemented a standard authenticating system that uses a repository in which details required for authentication are stored. Users, user groups, user roles, group roles, access points, etc. are stored in a repository. Many functions implemented within keystone for effecting authentication of the users who log in with their user name and passwords.

Keystone verifies the authentication of the users by checking the association between the users, user groups, roles, and the entry points for the users to start accessing the services. Keystone maintains a catalog of the services and entry points, which are API endpoints using which the users access the services. A user, group, service, or system is a digital representation of an Open Stack system. A tenant is an entry point form in which location the user starts accessing the service. The Keystone verifies the authenticity of the digital signature, assigns an entry point that is used by the user to access the resource.

Users, groups, tokens, tenants, roles, and endpoints are the elements used by Keystone for effecting authentication. A tenant combines resources that include processes, customers and users, etc. Roles are rights assigned to the users for being able to undertake a set of operations. Keystone issues a token to the users, which contain details related to the roles and the tenants that can be accessed by the user. Users access the services by providing the tokens to the services. A service verifies the roles using its internal policies and allows access to the service if the policies maintained by it enable access to the user having a specific role.

A token designed using a standard structure. The token intended to provide details related to the resources that can be accessed. A token is valid for some specific time, and the token revoked once issued after its expiry, in which case, the token deleted. An endpoint is a URL provided by the keystone for the users to start accessing the resource. Figure 3 shows the way the foundation interacts with other components of the OpenStack. Security with the Open Stack implemented through 3 different processes relating to authentication, authorization, and data security.

The following steps followed when a user tries to access an OPEN STACK service.

1. User logs into the Keystone using the user name password, which gets established when the user registers into the Open Stack system.
2. If the username and password found to be correct, the keystone develops a token containing the details of the tenants, which is a group including the details related to the users or resources. All the users placed in a group given access to the services contained in the Group specification. The Group, as such, is called as a Tenant.
3. The user sends a cross to the service the allocated token to the user.
4. The service verifies with the keystone the authentication details using its internal policies. The user is provided with the access if keystones confirm that the token is issued by it and also that the user request confirms to one of its policies.
5. If access is allowed, the service provides the endpoint to the user, which is nothing but the URL using which the resource required is accessed.
6. If access is not allowed, the user is notified of the rejection to permit the service, giving the reasons.

The architecture of the KEYSTONE module shown in Figure 4.



Figure 3 : Overall Interactions within Key Modules

Within keystone architecture shown in **Figure 4**, four-component services include token service, Catalogue service, and Policy service, and database service. The identity service provides authentication service that provides validation of credentials of the users, and the validation of the users concerning roles and Accounts and also validation regarding metadata data.

The "Keystone" component of Open Stack provides identity service for authenticating and for implementing high-level authorization. Keystone is a centralized identity and access management component of OpenStack, which achieves security through the use of tokens. The keystone module uses a pluggable data store (SQL, LDAP) for storing information related to resources, policies, users, user groups, projects, accounts etc. The database maintained by the Keystone for storing the access details is independent, and therefore, no other data stored in the database in which access details stored.



Figure 4 : Keystone architecture

Many external authentication systems are available, which can be opted by an organization for adaption provided that there is a compatibility with its internal authentication system and when there is a requirement to implement a stronger authentication system and also when desired to reduce the risk significantly. While the internal authentication system checks the correctness of the usernames and passwords, the external authentication system taken into account the digital certificates, digital signatures for authentication and also provides the endpoints based on the access control and its internal policies that it enforces.

A user can manage the OpenStack session using its dashboard (Horizon), accessed using a web browser. To be able to get the services from various services, the user has to authenticate to the Keystone server. First, the user gives identity and credentials (e.g., password) to Keystone. Assuming the user is registered, Keystone authenticates the user, creates a tamper-evident digital token that contains information about the user, the endpoint information of each service (e.g., Nova, Neutron, etc.), and the operations the user is allowed to perform at each of those services.

Keystone authentication performed by using public-key cryptography. It uses a digital signature, and the usage of the digital signature in this system is unconventional. It is well-known that a significant drawback of the digital signature is that it takes a longer time to sign and decrypt the data. For this reason, in the real-world, a digital signature is used for small-sized data (typically hashed data). But the existing system of keystone signs large amounts of data, and this makes the keystone system non-standard and inefficient for high-volume deployments. Keystone uses a protocol to implement security using Fernet Tokens. The system implemented is weak, which needs strengthening using either enhancing the protocol or implementing Multi-Factor authentication which uses an external well proved authentication system.

Keystone is one of the Open Stack components used for providing identification, authentication, and authorization service. This service categorized into two primary functions, which include Managing users and service Catalogue. User Management keeps track of user-related data, such as what roles the user has, which project the user belongs to, etc. Service Catalogue keeps track of what services are available and provides the location of the services' endpoints.

Keystone uses several services to deal with identity, tokens, catalogs, policy services, public key management for implementing authentication and authorization system.. crucial public cryptography allows users to communicate securely over public networks and verify the identity of a user using a digital signature. A digital signature is an electronic signature that can authenticate the user. In a digital signature, a sender typically uses the private key to sign the data, and the receiver uses the sender's public to verify the signature. A Certificate Authority (CA) plays the trusted role to vouch for the identity of the user with a specific public key.

In Open Stack, the keystone can play the role of a CA using the keystone-manage utility or done by a third party. A Keystone PKI token used for authentication. A PKI token is nothing but a token signed by the keystone using its private key. Keystone uses cryptographic message syntax (CMS) within PKI. For this reason, the token referred to as CMS token. Whenever the user authenticates with his/her user name and password, keystone gathers credential data (e.g., user's roles) of the user and creates a token and places them in a file called user metadata. The metadata contains all information of the user like token, service catalog, user role, etc. It also includes an issue and expiration date and the id of the token.

The project information follows next, after which the service catalog information placed. The service catalog has the information on the service(s) and related endpoints the authenticating user can avail. The endpoints are where the services should connect to obtain a specific service (e.g.,

compute vs. network service). After the endpoints, the information about the user listed. It shows the roles of the user, username, and id of the user. Again, this data called CMS data because the ID of the services here written in CMS format, and the signed CMS data is called CMS token.

When a user logs-in with username and password, the keystone gathers all of the information mentioned above and generates a CMS token and sends it to the user's workstation. The user's OpenStack client program in the client's workstation and caches the token locally and uses it for later requests. When the user requests a service, the client sends the token along with the service request to the Keystone endpoint. The Open Stack service verifies the user's signature and responds with the token. When the client needs any of the services like nova, glance, cinder, etc., it sends a request along with the CMS token to the related service component. The target service receives the CMS token and verifies the signature with keystone, and provides the requested service if the token is valid and the user is authorized.

Once a service receives the PKI token, it verifies the correctness of the same. The verification of the taken includes verification of the digital signature, token expiry date and time, and then proceed to handle revoked tokens and a keystone digital certificate required for confirmation of the digital certificate. The digital certificate can be obtained from KEYSTONE or through a third-party certificate authority. The CMS taken is verified using the certificate. If the signature is found valid, then the metadata is decrypted and then proceed to check the expiry of the token. An error is flagged if the digital certificate does not tally or the token expired.

Token verification carried using the token revocation list. The open stack services update the revocation list when the service requested is provided or when the token is either expired. The **ID** of the token is the **md5** hashed token, which is revoked by the service. Once a token revoked, the token is not valid anymore. The ID, if present in the withdrawn list, then the token is found to be invalid, and if not, the token considered as accurate. Once the token found to be correct, the service is allowed, and a response provided to the end-user. If the request is for a VM, then the VM is created and the IP address of the VM along with the valid port number provided to the user, who in turn uses the IP address for further processing required by the user, such as executing a program.

The whole process of authentication is based on the digital certificate. The method suffers from several drawbacks. The drawbacks include consumption of considerable amount of time for processing the token through digital certificate affecting the response time, inability to maintain confidentiality of the data related to the security system as the tokens contain essential information shared with the user, the need for significant processing for managing the tokens considering token creation, removing, revoking and invalidating.

TLS (transmission layer security) enabled within the Identify service for supporting the authentication system so that the tokens are secured while transmitted through the network. TLS provides an additional layer of security, leading to a higher level of protection. There was additional administrative overhead when TLS used. Issuing certificates to the end-user is a costly proposition. Implementation of TLS requires issues of digital certificates to the services and the users. A certificate authority required which issue certificates. The certificate authority can be situated either internally or externally. The Open Stack services check the validity of the certificates by referring the same to Certificate Authorities. However, Cloud computing Systems provided with an internal certificate server used for dealing with the certificate.

In OpenStack, Fernet tokens used as default tokens. Fernet uses a secure messaging system. The tokens designed in such a way that they are processed using specific API. There is no need to store Fernet tokens as the tokens are non-persistent. The tokens are lightweight as the size of the token is between 80 to 240 bytes, which leads to reducing the operational overheads. The authentication data contained within a packet (payload) is of the maximum size of 250 bytes. The data in the payload is encrypted and signed. There is no need to implement a token revoking system as the Fernet token is non-persistence. The Fernet tokens are universal across the services leading to a reduction in overhead when services have to communicate with each other. The Fernet tokens, as such, need not replicated as they transmitted across the network. The number of calls required for accessing the Fernet token is few, which leads to the high proficient processing of the tokens.

However, the Fernet format has problems that make it non-ideal. The Fernet specification fixed, and it is hard to make changes into it and thereby into the cryptography implementation of it. Moreover, the Fernet specification not recognized by any standards body and therefore not as carefully audited as an IETF standard, making it more susceptible to zero-day and other vulnerabilities. Taken being nonstandard cannot be implemented across different applications. Addressing these vulnerabilities falls solely on the cloud computing service providers.

The Fernet tokens do not support some of the requirements of the users. Applications require asymmetric tokens that are not persistent and avoid the need for digitally signing the same. The asymmetric signing of the tokens allows the distribution of the public keys from one server to the other and avoids the need for synchronizing the keys. The programs receiving these asymmetric keys just can only read and used for validation of the tokens. The server is generating the keys stored in storage regions configured to have read-only access. There is also a need for implementing fallback mechanisms when an attack is noticed on the Tokens or in applying the cryptography to encrypt the tokens. The tokens must be designed following a standard so that the tokens used across the services. The token management system should lead to too much added to the cost. Thus there is a need for implementing proper authentication systems within cloud computing

systems to make it more secure from the point of Authenticating the users for availing different services and securing the resources.

1.5 Security issues relating to Keystone Module

The critical study of the keystone module carried to find security lapses contained within the keystone module. The keystone module implemented considering various vulnerabilities existing in different security enforcement processes. Some of the Vulnerabilities include the ability of a user trying to login with several permutations and combinations of user IDs and passwords. The user-name and passwords protected from hacking by encrypting the same before storing them. There is a need to sense if anybody is trying to attack through processing the access log from time to time.

The tokens that are either stored or transmitted encrypted such that the eligible user only will decrypt and access the tokens. The user names and passwords made quite complicated so that it is difficult to attack even through brute force methods. Implementation of the delegation system will help, especially when found complicated, to make changes to the native policy. The user security-related data stored in such a way that only designated processes will be able to access the information. The designing of user names and passwords undertaken following security standards such as NIST. The authentication system must also be protected from phishing when the WEB interface used for authenticating user access.

The Keystone Module sends back an authentication string over an open a channel once the user ID and passwords found to be correct. The string travel over the network before the user receives it. The token contains the information that includes user roles, service catalog, token number, entry points, which are tenants in plain text. The text, as such, attacked while traveling over the network. The authentication text secured by making it move over TLS (Transport Layer Security) channel. If the channel is not secured, a Man-in-the-Middle attack enforced. The users of Open Stack can send repeated requests to access for availing the services. There is no frequency limit of the demands made by the user. The user can initiate a DDOS attack. Such an attack sensed, and the requests initiated by the users rejected when the frequency of the requests reaches beyond the limit.

2. PROBLEM DEFINITION

The Identity service provided within the keystone module leaves several vulnerabilities making any cloud computing system vulnerable for attacks. A sound security mechanism is needed to be built within the OpenStack cloud computing system so that the Open Stack system can be used effectively for creating either public or private clouds. A secure authentication system implemented for establishing the user credentials so that the desired security access to the services provided with the least amount of wastage of time. The authentication system implemented using security standards so that inter-application implementation achieved.

3. RELATED WORKS

Platform Specific digital signatures and tokens used for authentication within Open Stack. An independent, decentralized, and flexible Mechanism that serve the purpose of authentication presented by Razib Hassan Khan et al., [1]. They have used OpenID, which is an open-source for the development and implementation of authentication within Open Stack. They have developed and offered the authentication system as a service. The platforms proposed by then are built web services and have implemented a single-sign-on for accessing multiple services. The users signing into an operating system is also used as login into Open Stack. They have shown how the users who registered into OpenID can log into Dashboard/Django GUI.

API generally used within Open Stack EC2API [2] or OSAPI [3]) for implementing front-end GUI services. Through API, the processes that are related to Access control, authentication and cryptographic algorithms, and generation systems handled within Open Stack. Many weaknesses found when the authentication systems implemented using API calls. The user names and passwords when used within a different framework on which the service provider has no control for authenticating the user. Once the user verified, administrator credentials used for retrieving the credentials of the user. The server that provides the service in the open stack does not participate in the authentication process but rather depends on the credentials provided by the administrator.

Open Stack is a cloud computing software that is available as open-source. Open Stack initially designed to of Infrastructure as a service (IaaS). Users can ask for the kind of machine in terms of CPU power, extent memory and storage required, and the nature of the operating system that must run on the Machine. Users install an IDE and develop their application. Users can also connect their System software like database management software etc. Users can deploy their claims on the machines and also run the application.

C. Kaufman et al. [4] have presented the way the authentication protocol system used by Open Stack implemented within the Kerberos protocol. They have also introduced a prototype authentication system based on Kerberos standard. Marek Denis et al., [5] have explored the implementation of identity federation within the Open Stack system through the use of local identity called “Domain Accounts.”

Several frameworks developed in the past related to cloud computing systems. Some of the frameworks are open source based. The customers use the frameworks for building private clouds that offer different types of services. Some of the notable frameworks include Cloud Stack, Eucalyptus, and Open Nebula. Off late Open stack has become the most sought out Open sources based framework for developing users their private networks [6].

A new Enhanced authentication system that works in conjunction with the original authentication system

implemented within the keystone presented by B. Cui and T. Xi in [7]. They have shown details and the way the new model performed. They have compared the features of the new model with the features supported by Keystone and also have introduced the way the new model provides a high level of security by subjecting the open stack system with the attacks that cannot be mitigated by the keystone system.

Authenticating the users for providing secured storage and access to the information is required, when it comes to service-oriented information exchanges — identity management systems needed for ensuring confidentiality and security considering both sides of the client and provider. Many drawbacks exist within many of the cloud computing systems, including open stack, which causes data violations, unauthorized access. A single point of failure happens due to the use of centralized access. Security of cloud computing systems enhanced through Federated Identity management, which leads to the structured, adaptable, and systematic implementation of the security systems within cloud computing systems [8].

Benjamin Ertl [9] presented that Authentication for every kind of service has to be rendered based on cross-domain identification. They have introduced a protocol that considers the issue of linking different accounts associated with a client. The protocol proposed by them supports verification of authentication for each of the services requested by the clients. They have put their recommendation in terms of the existing federated infrastructures.

Policy-based methods and mechanisms used for effecting access control have been used by Georgios Katsikogiannis [10] for implementing multilevel identity integration, authentication, and authorization for providing secured access to cloud computing resources. They have used SOA for implementing a policy-based security system. They have analyzed Identity integration, user roles, authentication, authorized access control, and used for validating the rules. A cryptographic primitive, which is key-homomorphic embedded into RDIC (identity-based remote data integrity checking) protocol, which considers the user identity for reducing the complexity of a system. The modified RDIC helps in minimizing the cost of implementing PKI within RDIC, Yong Yu [11].

The self-adaption mechanism found to deal with the uncertainty that exists in a wide range of applications. The component “Keystone” contained in open stack can be included with self-adaption mechanisms so that internal threats counter-attacked. Carlos Eduardo et al., have presented that adds self-adaption components to Open Stack architecture to handle insider threats. They have analyzed several threats occurrences that can happen within the open stack and have evaluated the impact of the treats that occur in several scenarios. The self-adaption system explained considering several threat scenarios.

The system that implements ABAC/RBAC relies on the software components that protect access to several resources. The self-adaptive systems use the inputs provided by the elements meant for controlling the access for changing their behavior [12]. MAPE-K framework implements the self-adaptive model combined with the components that protect access to the resources [13].

A new authentication framework is proposed by Anisetti [14], which is deployed on a single open stack node and proved the effectiveness of the framework in implementing security within Open Stack. Cui [15] et al. have analyzed the security implementation within an Open Stack, considering each component separately. They have proposed a new model based on symmetric and asymmetric encryption the feasibility verified by deploying the same within Open Stack.

EC2API client [16] and the python-nova OSAPI client [17], which are API tools used for authentication of the users into cloud computing systems. A GUI hides the use of API and makes accessing a service much simpler for the users. WEB-GUI became the widely acceptable front end for making available the cloud services to the end-user and also the administrators. The Horizon component of Open Stack provides the GUI through which the user can access the services without the need for accessing the system through the use of API. There are, however, many shortcomings in the way the dashboard provides authentication of the end-user.

OpenID is an authentication system available as open sources extended to implement user preferences. The system provides a centralized Identity system that is user-centric, which means the users can opt for the kind of system that needs performing for enforcing the authentication to access the cloud computing resources. Open Stack [18] is an open-source system that offers Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)[18]. Open stack allows the users to provision the virtual machine with storage, computing resources, which are provisioned by the Open Stack components such as SWIFT, NOVA, etc. RACKSPACE and NASA together have developed Open Stack in python language [19].

Darshan et al. [20] have presented that keystone plays a significant role in binding all cloud computing projects together, each project implementing a service. There is a need to protect the resources used by the keystone such token repository, the identity of the users and resources, the endpoints, etc. The security of the open stack system is enormous as all the possible attackers have the source code of the Open Stack in their hands. The authors have analyzed the security requirements openstack and formed a threat model. A Restful API based authentication system that offers various security services needs implementation within the Open Stack system.

Open Stack is vulnerable to attack. Experimentation using a prototype specification revealed that the dashboard component of Open Stack is sensitive for attacking. Most of the researchers have offered different kinds of solutions used for making the Open Stack framework secured. The keystone module of the OpenStack provides another type of identity services that include identification, cataloging, management

of policies, and dealing with tokens for authentication. The identity services offered by the keystone module provided as a set of services situated at more than one endpoint. The services initiated through frontend calls. An authenticate call initiated from the user frontend will validate either project or user credentials, and on finding the eligibility, an authentication token issued using which the users access the service [21].

A study of the features supported in the keystone module [22] has found many weaknesses and a lack of support for access control, authentication based on attributed provisioning, audit mechanisms, and policy-based security enforcement. They have carried a threat and identified threats that exist concerning interfaces, components, internal processes of the elements within Open Stack.

Performance analysis of a two factor authenticated system carried by J. M. Alve, T. G. Rodrigues [23] using the different hypervisors, which include VMware, Xen, KVM, etc. They have used the user name password in the first instance and then followed by OTP based authorization. They have used OpenID protocol, so that single sign-on access to the services provided. They have shown that KVM hypervisor performance extensively well using a two-factor approach [24].

Controlling access to different resources considering Fine-grained access control, Scalability, data utilization, privacy preservation, and revocation of privilege is most complicated. A scheme covering these aspects was proposed by Rohit Ahuja [25] based on encryption carried using a set of attributes. Encryption of data undertaken through consideration of a set of attributes. They have considered that the users hierarchically organized, with each user carrying specific attributes. The characteristics are selected based on the path to be used for moving data from one user location to another, keeping because of the scalability. The authors have presented the method of hybridization of re-encryption and attribute-based encryption to realize the flexible revocation of system privileges.

X Darth protocol has been used by QuratulainAlam [26] for implementing identity management that spread across several domains. The follow of information that takes place when XDAuth used is modeled using Petri nets at a high level. The authors have used the Z language for analyzing the rules of information flow. The model verified by using a Z3 solver. Mell PM et al. [27] explained that the distribution of data among different servers is primarily dependent on the type of cloud (private, public, and Hybrid). The data distribution is also dependent on the users who are either internal, external, or both. The data distribution aspects considered while making available infrastructure as service through an open stack cloud computing system. Cappelli DM et al. [28] have explained that an insider threat is either a user or process that has authorized access to the internal resources and can attack the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of the data.

Self-adaption systems proved to be effective in dealing with insider threats as the mechanism deal with un-certainty considering a wide range of application and especially with the apps that are related to effecting access control mechanisms [29, 30, 31, 32]. De Lemos R et al. [33] have explained that the self-adaption systems could modify/update their behavior or data structure at run-time, thus dealing with the dynamic management of insider attacks.

An enhanced scheme presented by Yapping Chi et al. [34] strengthen the authentication system implemented within the keystone module of the Open Stack System. The project uses FreeIPA for including a sentinel that performs authentication, service management, and access control. The effectiveness of the sentinel tested by exposing the open stack to the external users. Jamie Bodley-Scott [35] presented that identity management is now being made user-centric from organization-centric approaches. Access to multiple service points implemented through user-centric approaches that are scalable and flexible. The user-centric methods based on single sign-on for making available different kinds of services. Through a single sign-on, a federation of login systems used, which improves the usability of service-oriented systems extensively.

Administering the policies and taking policy-related decisions are situated at specific policy decision points (PDP), and there can be many policy enforcement points that communicate with PDP for effecting the authentication and access control to the resources. Policy enforcement points situated within a cloud computing system that delivers with PDP for providing access to resources [36][37]. In Open Stack, the front-end GUI server within the client is a separate area within Open Stack. The user credentials have to be stored within the GUI server as Open Stack has no support for federation with the different authentication servers. The implementation of Multiple PAPs and PDPs is not possible when a centralized authentication server was not in place. There should be trust between the Client (Front-end GUI) and the cloud computing system, which is possible when a tightly coupled GUI and Cloud computing system implemented. The WEB server tightly coupled to the Back-end cloud computing servers which provide the services required by the users.

Open Stack has not used any standard for implementing security enforcement within the cloud. The security implemented within the OpenStack system is nonstandard. Kerberos is an authentication standard. SazzadMasudet al. [38] have studied the Kerberos system and have shown what the system implemented within the open stack as an independent component that federates with a keystone. The Keystone service developed using many interlinked and structured internal services [39]. The services offered by keystone can be services provided by keystone include policy services, catalog services, token services, and Identity services. The authentication system implemented within the keystone based on critical public infrastructure that helps the users to communicate securely over public networks — the identity of the users established through a digital signature. A user uses a private key to sign the message digitally, and the

receiver uses the public key of the user to decrypt the message and find the identity of the user who sent the message. A certificate authority, either internal or external, will verify the trustworthiness of the public key used by the user.

Most of the organizations around the world are shifting to cloud computing infrastructure for supporting their IT requirements due to cost, reliability, and availability of the required resources as and when needed. Many cloud service providers have already come into the market, playing a significant role. Some of the service providers that have come into play include SalesForce, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Rackspace, Oracle, Verizon, etc. [40]. A study conducted and an analysis of security issues relating to open stack carried especially considering object storage service. Security requirements, as stated in two different standards released by NIST(National institute of standards and technology) and ENISA (European Network and Information security agency) and came out with a set of security requirements implemented within Open Stack [41].

Series of versions of the Open Stack released, leading to the improvement of security enforcement that mitigates many of the vulnerabilities existing in the open stack. The openstack being open source exposes many threats and vulnerabilities. Open source-based Testbeds used for testing cloud computing systems, and these testbeds used to test new methods included in the Open Stack system for testing resource provisioning and management of services deployed under Multi-data centers [42].

A cloud computing adaption framework is proposed by Vicor Chang et al., [43], which can be customized by the user for implementing the organization-specific security requirements. They have presented that security enforcements applied in real-time through a Multi-Layer approach. They have used three layers for implementing security through a firewall, intrusion, and access control, implemented in three layers.

Security and privacy are the two major concerns of the users who store their data in the clouds. Several security concerns arise, which include access control, Data integrity control, access logging, access auditing, and managing the identity of the users when data transmitted between the user and the cloud. Many complex issues lead to multiple open problems requiring in-depth research carried Bhale Pradeep Kumar [44]. A cloud computing platform suffers from both external and internal attacks. Nit many Mechanisms/methods proposed to deal with internal attacks. Carlos Eduardo et al. [45] described self-adoption schemes to handle insider threats. The authors have presented the way the self-adaption systems introduced into the Open Stack cloud computing platform

Various models presented in the literature relating to authentication, authorization, and access control helps to implement different security measures that help to ensure integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the data as per the user requirements. Many models presented in the literature include RBAC (Role-based Access control) [46], ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control). These models, based on the assignment of attributes to roles either through relationships or rules, assign permissions to access the resources, find Rules that express relationships between the users and roles. An identity federation management system includes identity providers, assigned attributes to the users, and uses the Authentication related infrastructure provided by the service providers for effecting the security enforcement [47].

The authentication systems implemented within the cloud computing systems must be flexible such that the authentication system implemented varies based on the kind of resource requested by the user. Many existing cloud computing systems implement proprietary authentication systems through uses of signatures and tokens. Khan [48] has designed and implemented a model based on the OpenID framework so that limitations existing in proprietary protocols removed.

R. T. Fielding [49], in his thesis, has presented REST architecture for designing web applications. REST is stateless and works on the principle of cloud computing. The API uses a secured https protocol for proving communication between the users and a server. The users through API call logs into the server and get connected. Open Stack does not support federated identity management. Many federation based authentication systems such as OpenID [50][51], SAML [52] [53], Shibboleth [54] used within the open Stack for implementing the authentication system

In Open Stack, Security is built through the process of authentication and access control and also providing security infrastructure that can be used by the users to enforce security on their own. The Keystone Module within open stack takes care of security enforcement through primarily utilizing a process based on Tokenization. The Keystone module provides tokens to the users, and the users access the services offered by Open Stack with the help of tokens, Keystone uses Digital signatures for implementing the authentication system. Authenticating a massive amount of text would be cumbersome [55] when massive traffic between the clients and the cloud computing system expected. The authors have proposed to hash the data so that the size of the text reduced and then they have applied a digital signature

Security concerns are many when one wants to use cloud computing systems. Security is a real barrier to using cloud computing systems [56]. A survey conducted in 2016 revealed that security risks are the primary concerns/obstacles in using cloud computing systems. GidwaniIshan et al. made another study that focuses on the security issues and threats existing in Open Stack system., [57]. The authors argued that Open Stack did not implement any complexity within the password system and also that the passwords stored in plain text. They have conducted a penetration test using some of the existing tools and have come out that Open Stack is prone to future attacks as many vulnerabilities still existing in the system

The architecture of most of the open sources is similar [58]. Most of the cloud computing architectures consider including

a cloud controller and a set of nodes on which several services implemented. The controller controls the instances, network, administrative interfaces, and schedules the interfaces. The nodes run instances of VMs through the use of available resources.

KrysztBenedyczak et al. have presented the use of middleware for implementing federated computing [59]. They have proposed a method that does not require either certificates or delegation mechanisms. They have used a component called "Unity" for serving the identity management services. The method proposed by them allows many federation integration approaches that include integrating with OpenID and SAML. A single sign-on is sufficient to access the services submitted by multiple service providers recommended by JaweherZouari [60]. They have proposed identity as a service framework in which an Identity Finder system incorporated. The identity finder system, associates service providers with identity providers systems after taking the consent of the users. They have proposed additional functionality that helps to transform between different standards and mapping semantics relating to varying attributes so that the same identity context preserved over the entire system

A scheme that helps to implement RIBS (Revocable Identity-based signature) proposed by Xiaoping Jia [61] uses an external cloud revocation server used for carrying all critical updates. Xiaoping has proved that a new framework that incorporates RIBS is highly resistant to foraged messages and different identity attacks. They have convinced that RIBS is highly efficient when compared IBS scheme.

The self-adoption techniques did not lead to complete protection considering security and privacy, especially when insider threats are involved. Many contributions made to deal with securing the cloud computing systems [62, 63, 64], but none of these methods could solve the issues of insider attacks. Cole DE et al. [65] have explained that insider threats are not the same as those connected with the cloud computing components, which are either hypervisors or brokers. Insider threats can be at catastrophic resulting in considerable losses to the organizations as explained by Duncan A et al., [66]

An insider threat generally caused by authorized users of the system [67]. The internal user regarded as the inside attacker. Cert et al. [68] defined an employee, business partner, and contractor who has access to the internal information resources as the inside attackers. The users have intensions to take advantage of the company's data for unlawful activity affecting availability, integrity, and confidentiality regarded as inside attackers [69] [70]. Cappelli DM et al. [71] have considered the issue of security from the point of likely abuse of the data by the users, which can lead to some threat [72]. Insider risks classified as unintentional and intentional. Only intentional threats classified into insider attacks [73].

Clouds provide resources that are shared by several users/tenants through availing of different services that are made available by cloud computing providers — the accessibility to the resources controlled so that one user does not get into another user jurisdiction. Several security mechanisms must put in place, which includes authentication and access control to provide non-conflicting access to the resources [74][75].

Chi Yaping et al. [76] have used the FreeIPA framework and developed a sentinel who has been introduced into an open stack and proved the effectiveness of the same. Several papers published relating to securing various aspects within cloud computing systems some of which have not been included in Open Stack [77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84] [85][86][87].

4. THE GAP

None of the authentication systems proposed for implementation in OpenStack considered the use of a well-proven authentication system already in existence and also that a single sign-on is sufficient to access multiple applications, including the OpenStack Components. A multi-factor authentications system is required to implement a full proof security system within the OpenStack.

5. INVESTIGATIONS AND FINDINGS

The Vulnerabilities existing in the Keystone module are investigated from different perspectives, especially the issue of tokenization and the use of multi-factor authentication. Several mechanisms can be introduced into the OpenStack so that the identity of the users can be made more secure. The measures added into OpenStack include the introduction of more secured Tokens, implementation of multi-factor authentication through federation approaches, etc. Every path leads to some complexity. The more security built into the cloud computing system, the more will be the cost, especially in terms of loss of response time, which also requirement of sophisticated security models to be added into the system. The security models chosen must match the risk involved in providing a specific service required by the customers. The risk mitigation based security model is the most ideal.

RED HAT introduced the identity Management system (IMS) for assuring security. The IMS system used for authenticating and authorizing the users to have access to different resources contained in the computer system. Every user needs to be authenticated by the operating system before the user is allowed to have access to the application. The Application intern depended on the access provided by the operating system or enforces an additional security system built within the app. Every application running under the Red Hat operating system uses the IMS services for verifying the access rights of the user. The access mechanism as supported by the IMS systems, shown in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Authentication and authorizations IMS system

As explained earlier, Keystone uses Fernet services for authenticating and authorizing to have access to different resources, and the bottlenecks of using such a tokenization system need consideration. The IMS system provides several services through standard API for enforcing security based on international standards such as NIST. Federation of IMS system with Fernet gives high-security provisions, and also existing users need not have any additional registrations with OpenStack. The way the IMS system federated with Fernet shown in Figure 6.



Figure 6 : IMS federation with Fernet Tokenization system

It is necessary to complete prior tasks that include installation, configuration, and operationalization of IMS, Open Stack, and DNS Systems and also that IMS configured to communicate with Keystone using port number 636, so that IMS properly integrated with Keystone services All components of Open Stack that include NOVA, COMPUTE, KEYSTONE, HORIZON restarted for effecting the IMS system for authentication purposes. Users' accounts created in the IMS system for making the users interact through DASHBOARD. If a firewall installed to filter the communication between OpenStack and other services, then a configuration of the firewall is needed to allow the traffic between Keystone and IMS systems. An Open Stack controller node should be able to communicate with IMS and port number TCP636.

IMS (Identity Management System) is the Authentication system implemented by the Red Hat operating system which is known as the "Red Hat Identity Management" System and in short, it is referred to as IMS. IMS is used extensively for enforcing security when RED HAT used as an operating system. IMS proved to be a system that provides extensive protection. The keystone identity system needs strengthening so that the open-source software used for the development of public and private cloud to the utmost satisfaction of the clients. Multi-factor authentication by integrating the IMS with keystone gives a higher level of security

Identity Service (IMS) authenticates certain Red Hat Identity Management (IdM) users while retaining authorization settings and critical service accounts in the Identity Service database. As a result, Identity Service has read-only access to IdM for user account authentication, while retaining management over the privileges assigned to authenticated accounts. Before configuring and integrating IMS with OpenStack, the modules that include Red Hat Identity Management, Red Hat OpenStack Platform, and DNS name resolution installed, configured, and made operational. These steps allow IdM users to authenticate to OpenStack and access resources. OpenStack service accounts (such as keystone and glance), and authorization management (permissions and roles) will remain in the Identity Service database. Permissions and roles are assigned to the IdM accounts using Identity Service management tools.

For the IDM to work appropriately with Keystone, the Keystone for adding the IdM backend and Compute services on all nodes needs restarting for switching over to Keystone V3. Users will be unable to access the dashboard until their accounts created in IdM. To reduce downtime, consider pre-staging the IdM accounts well in advance of this change. If firewalls are filtering traffic between IdM and OpenStack, the firewall configured to allow communication between the OpenStack controller node and IdM using LDAP protocol using port number TCP636. The configuration steps shown in Table 1 are to be used to install and integrate the IdM with Keystone.

6. CONCLUSIONS

There is much vulnerability exposed by the Keystone component leaving the doors open for attack. These loose ends fixed if one seeks to use OpenStack for developing either the private or public cloud. Delegating another system well proven for enforcing security is the best choice. ADDS for windows and IMS for Unix based systems have been proven to support the most accurate security enforcement system. Multi-Factor authentication requires the integration of a

native system with another well-proven system yields the best secured environment.

The keystone module of OpenStack when integrated with the IMS system will yield the most desired secured environment especially for implementing the authentication system. Asymmetric crucial public management reduces the storage requirements and makes the processes related to enforcement of security more faster.OpenStack cloud computing system, when made more secure, will help the use of the same for building the public and private clouds more secure.

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Table 1: Configuration steps to integrate IdM with OpenStack

Configuration. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
CONFIGURE THE IDM (Identity Management Server		
1	An LDAP account created that will be used by Identity service. The account required for querying IdM LDAP service	# kinit admin # ipa user-add First name: OpenStack Last name: LDAP User [radministrator]: svc-LDAP
2	A new group called *grp-OpenStack* created. This group members will have permissions required to access the Keystone service	# ipa group-add --desc="OpenStack Users" grp-OpenStack
3	The password of the account *svc-LDAP control set and the same added to the grp-OpenStack* group	# ipa passwd svc-LDAP # ipa group-add-member --users=svc-LDAP grp-OpenStack
CONFIGURE THE LDAPS CERTIFICATE		
4	The location of the LDAP certificate fetched using the command *etc/OpenLDAP/ldap.conf*:	TLS_CACERT /etc/ipa/ca.crt
5	The certificate file copied to the node where Keystone installed Uses*scp* ca.crt *node.lab.local* (the Certificate file is copied to the node having domain being *node.lab.local*	cp /etc/ipa/ca.crt root@node.lab.local:/root/
6	Convert .crt file to .pem file on the controller node	openssl x509 -in ca.crt -out ca.pem -outform PEM
7	The ,pem file is to be installed on the OpenStack controller	cp ca.pem /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/ # update-ca-trust
8	The certificate file ".crt" must be copied to the directory where certificates are stored	# cp ca.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
CONFIGURE IDENTITY SERVICE		
9	Enable command line access to keystone v3 The keystone related command-line access needs to be enabled	
10	The file having the environment definitions copied to a file called overcloudrc	$ cp overcloudrc overcloudrc-v3
11	The overcloudrc-v3file edited	Change OS_AUTH_URLfrom *v2.0* to *v3*. For example: export OS_AUTH_URL=https://controllerIP:5000/v3/ Add the following entries to the bottom of overcloudrc-v3: export OS_IDENTITY_API_VERSION=3 export S_PROJECT_DOMAIN_NAME=Default export OS_USER_DOMAIN_NAME=Default
12	Enable the overcloudrc-v3 for storing the commands entered through the command line.	$ source overcloudrc-v3

Configure the controller

If containers used in OpenStack, some of the OpenStack components run within the containers, none of the configuration files which are in the purview of the operating system should be updated. For example, the configuration file /etc/cinder/cinder.conf si not be updated. This is because the containerized service will need to use the files stored in the Physical discs that connected to a system where the operating system installed. Even the configuration files situated in the container should not be updated as the changes made to the files lost as and when the container restarted. If any changes required to the configuration files stored in the container, then changes are to be made to the configuration files used to generate the container. These container-related configuration files are stored within /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/

For example:

keystone: /var/lib/config-data/puppet- generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf

cinder: /var/lib/config-data/puppet- generated/cinder/etc/cinder/cinder.conf

nova: /var/lib/config-data/puppet- generated/nova/etc/nova/nova.conf

Any changes will then be applied once the container restored using the commands as

sudo docker exec -it keystone pkill -HUP -f keystone

Configuration. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
13	The SELinux: needs to be configured	setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap=on
14	The directory that contains the domains created	# mkdir /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/domains/ # chown 42425:42425 /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/domains/
15	Install crudini using the command yum install crudini and initiate multiple backends by configuring the Keystone Module	# crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf identity domain_specific_drivers_enabled true # crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf identity domain_config_dir /etc/keystone/domains # crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf assignment driver sql
16	Add commands to the file */etc/OpenStack-dashboard/local_settings* : for enabling Multiple domains in the dashboard	OPENSTACK_API_VERSIONS = { "identity": 3 OPENSTACK_KEYSTONE_MULTIDOMAIN_SUPPORT = True OPENSTACK_KEYSTONE_DEFAULT_DOMAIN = 'Default'
17	The httpd service restarted for applying the setting made so far.	systemctl restart httpd
18	Additional backend configured	
19	A domain for Keystone created for integrating with IdM. Let the name of the domain be LAB	# OpenStack domain create LAB
20	A configuration file created for adding LDAP setting into the following file for adding the backend */var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/domains/keystone.LAB.conf*	[ldap] url = ldaps://idm.lab.local user = uid=svc-ldap,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=local user_filter = (memberOf=cn=grp-openstack,cn=groups,cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=local) password = RedactedComplexPassword user_tree_dn = cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=local user_objectclass = inetUser user_id_attribute = uid user_name_attribute = uid user_mail_attribute = mail user_pass_attribute = user_allow_create = False user_allow_update = False user_allow_delete = False tls_cacertfile = /etc/ssl/certs/ca.crt [identity] driver = ldap The details of the parameters shown in Table 2
21	The ownership of the config. Be changed to the keystone user	# chown 42425:42425 /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/domains/keystone.LAB.conf
Grant the admin user access to the domain:		
22	The ID of LAB Domain obtained	# OpenStack domain show LAB
23	The ID value of the user admin obtained	# OpenStack user list --domain default | grep admin | 3d75388d351846c6a880e53b2508172a | admin |
24	The ID value of the role of admin obtained	OpenStack role list

Configuration. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
25	Construct commands to add the admin user and role using the admin domain and ID obtained through previous steps	# openstack role add --domain 6800b0496429431ab1c4efbb3fe810d4 --user 3d75388d351846c6a880e53b2508172a 785c70b150ee4c778fe4de088070b4cf
26	Restart the keystone service to apply the changes: To use the changes the keystone module restarted.	sudo docker exec -it keystone pkill -HUP -f keystone
27	Find the List of users contained in the IdM domain and check whether keystone domain name exists	# OpenStack user list --domain LAB
28	Find the list of service accounts contained in Keystone database	# OpenStack user list --domain default
29	Every OpenStack component uses Keystone version 2.0. Keystone Version 3.0 supports Multi-Factor Authentication. Configuration of the file done to make every element use Keystone 3.0 so that multi-factor authentication implemented.	
30	Configure on Compute and controller, node to use keystone 3.0 by assigning a version number to keystone_authtoken auth_version variable	On the Compute nodes: # crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova_libvirt/etc/nova/nova.conf keystone_authtoken auth_version v3 On the controller # crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova/etc/nova/nova.conf keystone_authtoken auth_version v3
Configuration. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
32	The controller service restarted to effect the change	# systemctl restart openstack-nova-api.service openstack-nova-cert.service openstack-nova-conductor.service openstack-nova-consoleauth.service openstack-nova-novncproxy.service openstack-nova-scheduler.service # sudo docker exec -it keystone pkill -HUP -f keystone
33	The compute service restarted to effect the change	# systemctl restart OpenStack-nova-compute.service
Configure Block Storage to use keystone v3		
34	In */etc/cinder/cinder.conf*:	[keystone_authtoken] auth_uri = https://controllerIP:5000/v3 auth_version = v3 auth_uri - replace the controller with the IP address of the controller. If your deployment has more than one controller, you should use the keystone endpoint VIP instead of the controller IP
35	Restart cinder-apion all controllers	# systemctl restart openstack-cinder-api
36	Restart cinder-scheduler on all controllers:	systemctl restart OpenStack-cinder-scheduler
37	Restart cinder-volume (on one controller only):	pcs resource restart OpenStack-cinder-volume
38	Allow IdM users to access Projects**.** IdM users that are members of the *grp-OpenStack* IdM group granted permission to log in to a project in the dashboard:	

Configuration. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
39	Retrieve a list of IdM users:	# openstack user list --domain LAB + +-----+ | ID | Name | + +-----+ 1f24ec1f11aeb90520079c29f70afa060d22e2ce92b2eba7784c841ac418091e | user1 | 12c062fidm5f8b065434d9ff6fce03eb9259537c93b411224588686e9a38bf1 | user2] | afaf48031eb54c3e44e4cb0353f5b612084033ff70f63c22873d181fdae2e73c | user3| | e47fc21dcf0d9716d2663766023e2d8dc15a6d9b01453854a898cabb2396826e | user4 + +-----+
40	Retrieve a list of roles:	# OpenStack role list
41	Add users to roles so that the users can access the projects assigned to the specific roles.	# openstack role add --project demo --user 1f24ec1f11aeb90520079c29f70afa060d22e2ce92b2eba7784c841ac418091e _member_ To make user1 to have an administrative role # openstack role add --project demo --user 1f24ec1f11aeb90520079c29f70afa060d22e2ce92b2eba7784c841ac418091e admin The user will be able to access through the dashboard by entering the user name and password. The user has domain role cal also adds a new domain called LAB using domain field.
GRANT ACCESS TO THE DOMAIN TAB **The users must be assigned with admin role in the default domain so that domain name LAB can be accessed**		
42	Find the admin user's UUID:	openstack user list | grep admin | a6a8adb6356f4a879f079485dad1321b | admin |
43	Add the admin role in the default domain to the admin user:	$ openstack role add --domain default --user a6a8adb6356f4a879f079485dad1321b admin As a result, the admin user can now see the Domain tab.
CREATING A NEW PROJECT One has to decide where a new project must be created either in the default domain or in the keystone domain. The default domain used as an internal domain that serves the purpose of service accounts and to have access to the admin project, whereas all the other accounts and projects configured into the keystone domain.		
44	Changes to the dashboard log in process Adding multiple domains to the IdM enables the related domain fields in the dashboard. Users expected to enter the domain that matches their login credentials. This field manually filled with one of the domains present in the keystone. Users can access the domains that are attached to the login details of the users. The users can then select the domain to work-with. All the IdM accounts pick the domain with the name "LAB," and the default domain selected for accessing the keystone accounts.	# OpenStack domain list

Configuration. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
45	Changes to the command line While issuing commands for execution, the applicable domain must be specified so that the list of relevant users to that domain are listed	# OpenStack user list --domain LAB # OpenStack user list --domain Default
46	Test IdM integration	This procedure validates IdM integration by testing user access to dashboard features: *A.* Create a test user in IdM, and add the user to the grp-OpenStack IdM group. *B.* Add the user to the _member_ role of the demo tenant. *C.* Log in to the dashboard using the credentials of the IdM test user. *D.* Click on each of the tabs to confirm that they are presented successfully without error messages. *E.* Use the dashboard to build a test instance.
CONFIGURE FOR HIGH AVAILABILITY With keystone v3 enabled, you can make this configuration highly available by listing multiple IdM servers in the configuration file for that domain.		
47	To send all the traffic to IdM server, the URL definition in the *keystone.LAB.conf file be changed to idm.lab.local*:	url = ldaps://idm.lab.local,ldaps://idm2.lab.local One can add several IdM servers so that the same are highly available. If any query directed to *idm.lab.local* fails then the identity service will address the query to a second idM server. One can note that this is not Load Balancing Technique
48	Set the network timeout in */etc/OpenLDAP/ldap.conf*:	NETWORK_TIMEOUT 2 If a firewall configured in between the Controller component and IdM server, then the IdM server should not be configured to drop the packets received from the controller. If packets dropped then *python-keystone client will detect the dropped packets and redirect the packets to the second IdM server.*
CREATE A RC FILE FOR A NON-ADMIN USER		
49	$ cat overcloudrc-v3-user1 # Clear any old environment that may conflict. for key in $(set | awk '{FS="="} /^OS_/ {print $1}'); do unset $key ; done export OS_USERNAME=user1 export NOVA_VERSION=1.1 export OS_PROJECT_NAME=demo export OS_PASSWORD=RedactedComplexPassword export OS_NO_CACHE=True export COMPUTE_API_VERSION=1.1 export no_proxy=,10.0.0.5,192.168.2.11 export OS_CLOUDNAME=overcloud export OS_AUTH_URL=https://10.0.0.5:5000/v3 export OS_AUTH_TYPE=password export PYTHONWARNINGS="ignore:Certificate has no, ignore:A true SSLContext object is not available" export OS_IDENTITY_API_VERSION=3 export OS_PROJECT_DOMAIN_NAME=Default export OS_USER_DOMAIN_NAME=LAB	

Table 2: Steps to configure Keystone steps

Config. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
Enable command line access to keystone v3		
1	Create an environment variable called "overcloudrc-v3."	$ cp overclouds overclouds-v3
2	Change the authentication URL to refer to Version 3 of the authentication system	Change OS_AUTH_URLfrom *v2.0* to *v3.* For example: export OS_AUTH_URL=https://controllerIP:5000/v3/
3	Export the Environment variables related to OS-Identity-API-Version, Project-domain-name, and OS-user-domain-name	export OS_IDENTITY_API_VERSION=3 export PROJECT_DOMAIN_NAME=Default export OS_USER_DOMAIN_NAME=Default
4	The overcloudrc-v3 is enabled to contain the command lines entered in the session.	$ source overcloudrc-v3
Configure the controller		Most of the services of the open stack are now available as containers which include keystone, cinder, nova etc.No changes to the configuration files be done which are situated on physical servers as the container services do not access these files No changes to the configuration files contained within the containers as the changes made ignored every time a restart takes place Any changes to the configuration files retained when changes made to configuration files used to generate the containers
If keystone is running on the controller node then		
5	Configure SELinux:	# setsebool -P authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap=on
6	Create the domainsdirectory	# mkdir /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/domains/ # chown 42425:42425 /var/lib/config-data/puppet- generated /keystone /etc /keystone/ domains/
7	Configure keystone to use multiple back ends:	# crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf identity domain_specific_drivers_enabled true # crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf identity domain_config_dir /etc/keystone/domains # crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/keystone.conf assignment driver sql

8	To add commands to /etc/openstack-dashboard/local_settings: to enable multiple domains in the dashboard	OPENSTACK_API_VERSIONS =
		{
		"identity": 3
		}
		OPENSTACK_KEYSTONE_MULTIDOMAIN_SUPPORT = True
		OPENSTACK_KEYSTONE_DEFAULT_DOMAIN = 'Default'
		Restart httpdto apply the settings:-
		# systemctl restart httpd

Configure an additional back-end: called LAB, which is the NetBIOS name to use as the Identity Service domain.		
9	The ADDS system must recognize the domain name of the Keystone. To create A domain name called LAB within OpenStack which will be the NetBIOS name for OpenStack	# OpenStack domain create LAB

Config. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
10	Add LDAP settings to Keystone.LAB configuration file. This setting will create an ADDS backend. /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/domains/keystone.LAB.conf The settings shown on the right needs to be changed to meet the customer local ADDS environment	url = ldaps://addc.lab.local:636 user = CN=svc-ldap,OU=labUsers,DC=lab,DC=local password = RedactedComplexPassword suffix = DC=lab,DC=local user_tree_dn = OU=labUsers,DC=lab,DC=local user_objectclass = person user_filter = (|(memberOf=cn=grp-openstack,OU=labUsers,DC=lab,DC=local)(memberOf=cn=grp-openstack-admin,OU=labUsers,DC=lab,DC=local)(memberOf=memberOf=cn=grp-openstack-demo,OU=labUsers,DC=lab,DC=local))
		user_id_attribute = sAMAccountNameuser_name_attribute = sAMAccountNameuser_mail_attribute = mail user_pass_attribute = user_enabled_attribute = userAccountControluser_enabled_mask = 2 user_enabled_default = 512 user_attribute_ignore = password,tenant_id,tenantsuser_allow_create = False user_allow_update =False user_allow_delete =False group_objectclass =group group_tree_dn = OU=labUsers,DC=lab,DC=local group_filter = (CN=grp-openstack*) group_id_attribute = cngroup_name_attribute = name group_allow_create = False group_allow_update =False group_allow_delete =False use_tls =False tls_cacertfile = /etc/ssl/certs/addc.lab.local.crt query_scope = sub chase_referrals = false [identity] driver = idap
11	To make the keystone user the owner of the configuration file	# chown 42425:42425 /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/keystone/etc/keystone/domains/keystone.LAB.conf
12	To rerun the keystone component to effect the changes	# sudodocker exec -it keystone pkill -HUP -f keystone
To allocate the domain access to the admin user.		
13	To get the ID of LABdomain	# OpenStack domain show LAB
14	To get ID of *admin* user:	# openstack user list --domain default | grep admin | 3d75388d351846c6a880e53b2508172a | admin |
15	To get the ID of *admin* role	# OpenStack role list
16	To assign admin role of keystone "LABdomain" to the admin user using the Domain names and admin IDs returned in the earlier steps	# openstack role add --domain 6800b0496429431ab1c4efbb3fe810d4 --user 3d75388d351846c6a880e53b2508172a 785c70b150ee4c778fe4de088070b4cf
17	To view the list of users contained in domain LAB and default domains	# OpenStack user list --domain LAB
18	To view the account names contained in the database related to identity services	# OpenStack user list --domain default

Config. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
Configure Compute to use keystone v3		
19	Adjust the keystone_authtokenvalue on the controller and compute node	
20	Set the keystone_authtokenvalue on Compute nodes	# crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova_libvirt/etc/nova/nova.conf keystone_authtoken auth_version v3
21	Set the keystone_authtokenvalue on the controller:	# crudini --set /var/lib/config-data/puppet-generated/nova/etc/nova/nova.conf keystone_authtoken auth_version v3
22	Re-run the controller component to effect the changes	# systemctl restart openstack-nova-api.service openstack-nova-cert.service openstack-nova-conductor.service openstack-nova-consoleauth.service openstack-nova-novncproxy.service openstack-nova-scheduler.service # sudodocker exec -it keystone pkill -HUP -f keystone
23	Re-run the compute component to effect the changes	# systemctl restart OpenStacknova-compute.service
Configure Block Storage to use keystone v3		
24	In */etc/cinder/cinder.conf*:	[keystone_authtoken] auth_uri = https://controllerIP:5000/v3 auth_version = v3 auth_uri - replace controllerIPwith the IP address of the controller. If your deployment has more than one controller, you should use the keystone endpoint VIP instead of the controller IP.
25	Re-run the cinder-API-on on all the nodes	# systemctl restart OpenStack-cinder-API
26	Re-run cinder-scheduleron all nodes	# systemctl restart openstack-cinder-scheduler
27	Re-run cinder-volumeon the main controller	# pcs resource restart openstack-cinder-volume
28	To authorize the active director groups to have access to projects to eliminate the requirement of adding a role to each user to have access to the projects	
29	Administrator to Complete the steps in the right cell	Create the groups named grp-OpenStack-admin Active Directory, grp-OpenStack-demo Add Active Directory users to the above groups, Add Active Directory users to the grp-OpenStack group.
30	The following steps assign roles to ADDS groups so that the users will have access to OpenStack resources.	
	1. Get the list od ADDS groups	# OpenStack group list --domain LAB
	2. Get the list of ADDS roles	# OpenStack role list
	3. Assign the access to the projects to the Active Directory groups	# openstack role add --project demo --group d971bb3bd5e64a454cbd0cc7af4c0773e78d61b5f81321809f8323216938cae8 _member_

Config. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
Allow Active Directory users to access Projects		
Config. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
31	To grant permissions to the grp-OpenStack group so that the Gropumemebers can log into a project through a dashboard.	
	Find the list of AD users:	# OpenStack user list --domain LAB
	Find the list of roles:	# OpenStack role list
	To assign access to the projects to the users by adding one more role to the users	# openstack role add --project demo --user 1f24ec1f11aeb90520079c29f70afa060d22e2ce92b2eba7784c841ac418091e_member_ Or, if you want user1to be an administrative user of the demoproject, you add them to the adminrole: # openstack role add --project demo --user 1f24ec1f11aeb90520079c29f70afa060d22e2ce92b2eba7784c841ac418091e admin
32	To assign access rights to the Domain Tab so that administrator can use the same by adding an admin role	
	1. Find the adminuser's UUID:	$ openstack user list | grep admin | a6a8adb6356f4a879f079485dad1321b | admin |
	2.Add the adminrole in the defaultdomain to the adminuser:	$ openstack role add --domain default --user a6a8adb6356f4a879f079485dad1321b admin
33	The user projects created with either the default domain name or the keystone domain name. The default domain name is an internal domain name used to manage the service accounts	
34	A domain field is created within the dashboard when multiple domains configured in the Identity service. User must enter an area that belongs to them using their login credentials	
35	Changes to the command line For specific commands, you might need to specify the applicable domain. For example, appending -- domain Labin this command returns users in the LAB domain (that are members of the *grp-OpenStack* group): # OpenStack user list --domain LAB. Appending --domain Defaultreturns the built-in keystone accounts: # OpenStack user list --domain Default	
36	The ADDS system integration with the keystone tested by using the dashboard features. The testing carried using the following steps Create a User in Active Directory Add the user to grp-OpenStack adds group Add user _member_role related to demotenant Login to Dashboard using new user credentials Click on the TABS Create a test instance through Dashboard. All the TABS shall have the details related to the users, their roles and the projects that they can access	

Config. Serial	Configuration step	Configuration Command Strings
37	Activate keystone v3 for achieving high availability through configuring the same to allow configuring multiple domain controllers. Version v1 and V2 are good enough with a single domain controller.	
	Add a second server to the urlentry.	url = ldaps://addc.lab.local,ldaps://addc2.lab.local Keystone will send all queries to the domain controller by changing the URL set in the keystone — Lbconfig file.
	Set the network timeout in /etc/OpenLDAP/ldap.conf	NETWORK_TIMEOUT 2
	Create an RC file for a non-admin user	$ cat overcloudrc-v3-user1 # Clear any old environment that may conflict. for key in $(set | awk '{FS="="} /^OS_/ {print $1}'); do unset $key ; done export OS_USERNAME=user1 export NOVA_VERSION=1.1 export OS_PROJECT_NAME=demo
	Create an RC file for a non-admin user	export OS_PASSWORD=RedactedComplexPassword export OS_NO_CACHE=True export COMPUTE_API_VERSION=1.1 export no_proxy=,10.0.0.5,192.168.2.11 export OS_CLOUDNAME=overcloud export OS_AUTH_URL=https://10.0.0.5:5000/v3 export OS_AUTH_TYPE=password export PYTHONWARNINGS="ignore:Certificate has no, ignore:A true SSLContext object is not available" export OS_IDENTITY_API_VERSION=3 export OS_PROJECT_DOMAIN_NAME=Default export OS_USER_DOMAIN_NAME=LAB

The keystone components installed in the controller nodes also need to be configured. The description of the parameters and the values to set within the configuration described in Table 3.

Table 3: Description of the parameters expressed in the configuration related to KEYSTONE installed on the Controller node

Parameter Serial	Parameter	Description
1	URL	The AD Domain Controller to use for authentication. Uses LDAPS port 636.
2	user	The *Distinguished Name* of an AD accounts to use for LDAP queries. For example, you can locate the *DistinguishedName* value of the *svc-LDAP* account in AD using Get-AD user svc-LDAP | select Distinguished Name
3	password	The plaintext password of the AD account used above.
4	suffix	The *Distinguished Name* of your AD domain. You can locate this value using Get- ADDomain | select Distinguished Name
5	user_tree_dn	The *Organizational Unit* (OU) that contains the OpenStack accounts.
6	user_objectclass	DefinesthetypeofLDAPuser.ForAD,use the persontype.
7	user_filter	Filters the users presented to Identity Service. As a result, only members of the grp- OpenStack group can have permissions defined in Identity Service. This value requires the full *Distinguished Name* of the group: Get-ADGroup grp-OpenStack | select DistinguishedName
8	user_id_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for user IDs.
9	user_name_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for *names*.

10	user_mail_attribute	MapstheADvaluetouseforuseremail addresses.
Parameter Serial	Parameter	Description
11	user_pass_attribute	Leave this value blank.
12	user_enabled_attribute	The AD setting that validates whether the account is enabled.
13	user_enabled_mask	Defines the value to check to determine whether an account is enabled. Used when Booleans returned.
14	user_enabled_default	TheADvaluethatindicatesthatanaccountis enabled.
15	user_attribute_ignore	Defines user attributes that Identity Service should disregard.
16	user_allow_create	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
17	user_allow_update	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
18	user_allow_delete	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
19	group_objectclass	Maps the AD value to use for *groups*.
20	group_tree_dn	The *Organizational Unit* (OU) that contains the user groups.
21	group_filter	Filters the groups presented to Identity Service.
22	group_id_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for group IDs.
23	group_name_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for group names.
24	group_allow_create	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
25	group_allow_update	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
26	group_allow_delete	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
27	use_tls	Defines whether TLS used. TLS needs to be disabled if you are encrypting with LDAPS rather thanSTARTTLS.
28	tls_cacertfile	Specifies the path to the *.crt*certificate file.
29	query_scope	Configures Identity Service to also search within nested child OUs when locating users that are members of the grp-OpenStack group.
30	chase_referrals	Set to false, this setting prevents python- LDAP from chasing all referrals with anonymous access.
31	URL	The AD Domain Controller to use for authentication using LDAPS port 636.
32	user	The*DistinguishedName*ofanADaccountsto useforLDAPqueries.Forexample,youcan locatethe*DistinguishedName*valueofthe *svc-ldap*accountinADusingGet-ADuser svc-ldap | select DistinguishedName
33	password	The plaintext password of the AD account used above.
34	suffix	The *Distinguished Name* of your AD domain. You can locate this value using Get-ADDomain | select DistinguishedName
35	user_tree_dn	The *Organizational Unit* (OU) that contains the OpenStack accounts.
36	user_objectclass	DefinesthetypeofLDAPuser.ForAD,use the persontype.

Parameter Serial	Parameter	Description
37	user_filter	Filters the users presented to Identity Service. As a result, only members of the grp-OpenStack group can have permissions defined in Identity Service. This value requires the full *Distinguished Name* of the group: Get-ADGroup grp-OpenStack | select DistinguishedName
38	user_id_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for user IDs.
39	user_name_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for *names.*
40	user_mail_attribute	MapstheADvaluetouseforuseremail addresses.
41	user_pass_attribute	Leave this value blank.
42	user_enabled_attribute	The AD setting that validates whether the account is enabled.
43	user_enabled_mask	Defines the value to check to determine whether an account is enabled. Used when Booleans not returned.
44	user_enabled_default	TheADvaluethatindicatesthatanaccountis enabled.
45	user_attribute_ignore	Defines user attributes that Identity Service should disregard.
46	user_allow_create	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
47	user_allow_update	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
48	user_allow_delete	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
49	group_objectclass	Maps the AD value to use for *groups.*
50	group_tree_dn	The *Organizational Unit* (OU) that contains the user groups.
51	group_filter	Filters the groups presented to Identity Service.
52	group_id_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for group IDs.
53	group_name_attribute	Maps the AD value to use for group names.
54	group_allow_create	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
55	group_allow_update	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
56	group_allow_delete	SetthisvaluetoFalse,askeystoneonly requires read-onlyaccess.
57	use_tls	Defines whether TLS used. TLS needs to be disabled if you are encrypting with LDAPS rather thanSTARTTLS.
58	tls_cacertfile	Specifies the path to the *.crt*certificate file.
59	query_scope	Configures Identity Service to also search within nested child OUs when locating users that are members of the grp-OpenStack group.
60	chase_referrals	Set to false, this setting prevents python- LDAP from chasing all referrals with anonymous access.