

Packet Dropping Attacks in Wireless Networks

T.Bhanu prakash¹, K. Guru Jyothsna Devi²

¹M.Tech CSE Student, S.V.Engineering College, Tirupati, AP, India
 bhanu3090@gmail.com

² Assistant Professor, Dept. of CSE, S.V.Engineering College, Tirupati, AP, India,
 K.jyothsnadevi515@gmail.com



ABSTRACT

A link error and malicious packet drops in 2 sources for packet losses in multi-hop wireless circumstantial network. we tend to observe that sequence of packet losses within the network, I fascinated by confirm whether or not the losses area unit caused by link errors solely, or by the combined result of link errors and malicious drop. I particularly fascinated by the insider-attack case, wherever malicious nodes that area unit a part of the route exploit their information to speak context to selective drop atiny low quantity of packets crucial to the network performance. as a result of the packet born rate during this case is resembling the channel error rate, typical formula that area unit supported detection the packet loss rate cannot succeed satisfaction detection accuracy. to boost the detection accuracy, we tend to propose to take advantage of the correlations between lost packets. to make sure truthful calculation of those correlations, I developed a homomorphic linear appraiser (HLA) primarily based public audit design that enables the detector to verify the honesty of the packet loss info rumored by nodes. This construction is privacy conserving, collusion proof, and incurs low communication and storage overheads. to scale back the computation overhead of the baseline theme, a packet-block-based mechanism is additionally projected, that permits one to trade detection accuracy for lower computation complexity. Through intensive simulations, we tend to verify that the projected mechanisms succeed considerably higher detection accuracy than typical ways like a maximum-likelihood primarily based detection.

Index Terms—packet dropping, secure routing, attack detec-tion, homomorphic linear signature, auditing.

I. INTRODUCTION

In a multi-hop wireless network, nodes get together in relay-ing/routing traffic. Associate someone will exploit this cooperative nature to launch attacks. For instance, the someone might 1st faux to be a cooperative node within the route discovery method. Once being enclosed in a very route, the someone starts dropping packets. Within the most severe type, the malicious node merely stops forwarding each packet received from upstream nodes, fully disrupting the trail between the supply and therefore the destination. Eventually, such a severe Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack will paralyze the network by partitioning its topology. Even though persistent packet dropping will effectively degrade the performance of the network, from the attacker's viewpoint such associate "always-on" attack has its disadvantages. First, the continual presence of extraordinarily high packet loss rate at the malicious nodes makes this sort of attack simple to be detected .Second, once being detected, these attacks area unit simple to mitigate. for instance, just in case the attack is detected however the malicious nodes aren't known, one will use the irregular multi-path routing algorithms [28][29] to circum-vent the black holes generated by the attack, probabilistically eliminating the attacker's threat. If the malicious nodes also are known, their threats will be fully eliminated by merely deleting these nodes from the network's routing table.

A malicious node that's a part of the route will exploit its information of the network protocol and therefore the communication context to launch associate corporate executive attack—an attack that's intermittent, however are able to do identical performance degradation result as a persistent attack at a way lower risk of being detected. Specifically, the malicious node might appraise the importance of varied packets, so drop the little quantity that area unit deemed extremely crucial to the operation of the network. for instance, in a very frequency-hopping network, these may well be the packets that convey frequency hopping sequences for network-wide frequency-hopping synchronization; in a billboard hoc psychological feature radio network, they may be the packets that carry the idle channel lists (i.e., white spaces) that area unit accustomed establish a network-wide management channel. By targeting these extremely crucial packets, the authors in [21], [24], [25] have shown that associate intermittent corporate executive assaulter will cause important harm to the network with low chance of being caught. during this paper, we tend to {are interested|have associate interest} in combating such an corporate executive attack. above all, we tend to have an interest within the drawback of detection the incidence of selective packet drops and distinctive the malicious node(s) accountable for these drops.

Detecting selective packet-dropping attacks is extraordinarily difficult in a very extremely dynamic wireless surroundings. the issue comes from the necessity that we'd like to not solely notice the place (or hop) wherever the packet is born, however conjointly establish whether or not the drop is intentional or unintentional. Specifically, because of the open nature of wireless medium, a packet visit the network may well be caused by harsh channel conditions (e.g., fading, noise, and interference, a.k.a., link errors), or by the corporate executive assaulter. In associate open wireless surroundings, link errors area unit quite important, and should not be considerably smaller than the packet dropping rate of the corporate executive assaulter. So, the corporate executive assaulter will camouflage underneath the background of harsh channel conditions. during this case, simply by perceptive the packet loss rate isn't

enough to accurately establish the precise reason behind a packet loss.

The higher than drawback has not been well self-addressed within the literature. As mentioned in Section II, most of the connected works preclude the paradox of the surroundings by presumptuous that malicious dropping is that the solely supply of packet loss, so there's no have to be compelled to account for the impact of link errors. On the opposite hand, for the little variety of works that differentiate between link errors and malicious packet drops, their detection algorithms sometimes need the quantity of maliciously-dropped packets to be considerably over link errors, so as to attain a suitable detection accuracy.

In this paper, we tend to develop associate correct formula for detection selective packet drops created by corporate executive attackers. Our algo-rithm conjointly provides a truthful and publically verifiable call statistics as a symptom to support the detection call. The high detection accuracy is achieved by exploiting the correlations between the positions of lost packets, as calculated from the auto-correlation perform (ACF) of the packet-loss electronic image—a bitmap describing the lost/received standing of every packet in a very sequence of consecutive packet transmissions. the essential plan behind this methodology is that albeit malicious dropping might lead to a packet loss rate that's resembling nor-mal channel losses, the random processes that characterize the 2 phenomena exhibit completely different correlation structures (equivalently, completely different patterns of packet losses). Therefore, by detection the correlations between lost packets, one will decide whether or not the packet loss is only because of regular link errors, or could be a combined result of link error and malicious drop. Our formula takes under consideration the cross-statistics between lost packets to create aa lot of informative call, and so is in sharp distinction to the standard ways that bank solely on the distribution of the quantity of lost packets.

The main challenge in our mechanism lies in a way to guarantee that the packet-loss bitmaps rumored by

individual nodes on the route area unit truthful, i.e., replicate the particular standing of every packet transmission. Such honesty is crucial for proper calculation of the correlation between lost packets. This challenge isn't trivial, as a result of it's natural for associate assaulter to report false info to the detection formula to avoid being detected. for instance, the malicious node might inform its packet-loss electronic image, i.e., some packets might be born by the node however the node reports that these packets are forwarded. Therefore, some auditing mechanism is required to verify the honesty of the rumored info. Considering that a typical wireless device is resource-constrained, we tend to conjointly need that a user ought to be ready to delegate the burden of auditing and detection to some public server to save lots of its own resources

Our construction conjointly provides the subsequent new options. First, security-preserving: the general public auditor shouldn't be ready to discern the content of a packet delivered on the routethrough the auditing info submitted by individual hops, notwithstanding what percentage freelance reports of the auditing info area unit submitted to the auditor. Second, our construction incurs low communication and storage overheads at intermediate nodes. This makes our mechanism applicable to a large vary of wireless devices, as well as affordable wire-less sensors that have terribly restricted information measure and memory capacities. this is often conjointly in sharp distinction to the standard storage-server state of affairs, wherever bandwidth/storage isn't thought of a difficulty. Last, to considerably scale back the computation overhead of the baseline constructions so they'll be utilized in computation-constrained mobile devices, a packet-block-based formula is projected to achieves ascendable signature generation and detection. This mechanism permits one to trade detection accuracy for lower computation complexness.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we tend to review the connected work. The system/adversary models and drawback statement area unit represented in Section III. we tend to gift the projected theme and analyze its security

performance and overheads in Section IV. The low-computation-overhead block-based formula is projected in Section V. Simulation results area unit conferred in Section VI, and that we conclude the paper in Section VII. through the auditing info submitted by individual hops, notwithstanding what percentage freelance reports of the auditing info area unit submitted to the auditor. Second, our construction incurs low communication and storage overheads at intermediate nodes. This makes our mechanism applicable to a large vary of wireless devices, as well as affordable wire-less sensors that have terribly restricted information measure and memory capacities. this is often conjointly in sharp distinction to the standard storage-server state of affairs, wherever bandwidth/storage isn't thought of a difficulty. Last, to considerably scale back the computation overhead of the baseline constructions so they'll be utilized in computation-constrained mobile devices, a packet-block-based formula is projected to achieves ascendable signature generation and detection. This mechanism permits one to trade detection accuracy for lower computation complexness.

II. CONNECTED WORK

Depending on what quantity weight a detection formula provides to link errors relative to malicious packet drops, the connected work will be classified into the subsequent 2 classes.

The first class aims at high malicious dropping rates, wherever most (or all) lost packets area unit caused by malicious dropping. during this case, the impact of link errors is unnoticed. Most connected work falls into this class. supported the methodology accustomed establish the offensive nodes, these works will be more classified into four sub-categories. the primary sub-category relies on credit systems [9][34][10]. A system provides associate incentive for cooperation. A node receives credit by relaying packets for others, and uses its credit to send its own packets. As a result, a maliciously node that continuous to drop packets can eventually use up its credit, and can not be ready to send its own traffic. The second sub-category relies on name systems

[12][8][14][19][20][11][4]. A name system depends on neighbors to watch and establish misbehaving nodes. A node with a high packet dropping rate is given a nasty name by its neighbors. This reputation info is propagated sporadically throughout the network and is employed as a vital metric in choosing routes. Consequently, a malicious node are going to be excluded from any route. The third sub-category of works depends on end-to-end or hop-to-hop acknowledgements to directly find the hops wherever packets area unit lost [18][22][23][5][6][32]. A hop of high packet loss rate are going to be excluded from the route. The fourth sub-category addresses the matter victimisation cryptanalytic ways. for instance, the add [17] utilizes Bloom filters to construct proofs for the forwarding of packets at every node. By examining the relayed packets at ordered hops on a route, one will establish suspicious hops that exhibit high packet loss rates. Similarly, the tactic in [16][33] traces the forwarding records of a selected packet at every intermediate node by formulating the tracing drawback as a Renyi-Ulam game. the primary hop wherever the packet isn't any longer forwarded is taken into account a suspect for misbehaving.

The second class targets the state of affairs wherever the quantity of maliciously born packets is considerably over that caused by link errors, however the impact of link errors is non-negligible. sure information of the wireless channel is important during this case. The authors in [26] projected to form the traffic at the mackintosh layer of the supply node in keeping with a definite system, so intermediate nodes area unit ready to estimate the speed of received traffic by sampling the packet arrival times. By scrutiny the supply traffic rate with the calculable received rate, the detection formula decides whether or not the discrepancy in rates, if any, is at intervals an affordable vary specified the distinction will be thought of as being caused by traditional channel impairments solely, or caused by malicious dropping, otherwise. The works in [13] and [31] projected to notice malicious packet dropping by investigation the quantity of lost packets. If the quantity of lost packets is considerably larger than the expected packet loss rate created by link errors,

then with high chance a malicious node is contributory to packet losses.

All ways mentioned higher than don't perform well once malicious packet dropping is very selective. a lot of specifically, for the credit-system-based methodology, a malicious node should still receive enough credits by forwarding most of the packets it receives from upstream nodes. Similarly, within the reputation-based approach, the malicious node will maintain a fairly smart name by forwarding most of the packets to successive hop. whereas the Bloom-filter theme is in a position to produce a packet forwarding proof, the correctness of the proof is probabilistic and it's going to contain errors. For extremely by selection attacks (low packet-dropping rate), the intrinsic error rate of Bloom filter considerably undermines its detection accuracy. As for the acknowledgement-based methodology and every one the mechanisms within the second class, just investigation the quantity of lost packets doesn't provides a enough ground to notice the \$64000 wrongdoer that's inflicting packet losses. this is often as a result of the difference within the variety of lost packets between the link-error-only case and therefore the link-error-plus-malicious-dropping case is tiny once the assaulter drops solely some packets. Consequently, the detection accuracy of those algorithms deteriorates once malicious drops become extremely selective.

Our study targets the difficult state of affairs wherever link errors and malicious dropping cause comparable packet loss rates. the hassle within the literature on this drawback has been quite preliminary, and there's some connected works. Note that the cryptanalytic ways projected in [24] to counter selective packet electronic jamming target a unique issue than the detection drawback studied during this paper. The ways in [24] delay a transmitter from recognizing the importance of a packet once the packet has been with success transmitted, so there's no time for the transmitter to conduct electronic jamming supported the content/importance of the packet. rather than making an attempt to notice any malicious behavior, the approach in [24] is proactive, and therefore incurs

overheads despite the presence or absence of attackers.

III. SYSTEM MODELS AND drawback STATEMENT

A. Network and Channel Models

Consider associate absolute path PSD in a very multi-hop wireless circumstantial network, as shown in Figure one. The supply node S ceaselessly sends packets to the destination node D through intermediate nodes n_1, \dots, n_K , wherever N_i is that the upstream node of n_{i+1} , for one $i \in \{1, \dots, K-1\}$. we tend to assume that S is alert to the route PSD, as in Dynamic supply Routing (DSR) [15].

If DSR isn't used, S will establish the nodes in PSD by playing a traceroute operation. Here we tend to in the main target visible once the quantity of maliciously born packets is comparable those caused by link errors. to properly calculate the correlation between lost packets, it's crucial to accumulate truthful packet-loss info at individual nodes. we tend to developed associate HLA-based public auditing design that ensures truthful packet-loss reportage by individual nodes. This design is collusion proof, needs comparatively high procedure capability at the supply node, however incurs low communication and storage overheads over the route. to scale back the computation overhead of the baseline construction, a packet-block-based mechanism was conjointly projected, that permits one to trade detection accuracy for lower computation complexness.

Some open problems stay to be explored in our future work. First, the projected mechanisms area unit restricted to static or quasi-static wireless circumstantial networks. Frequent changes on topology and link characteristics haven't been thought of. Extension to extremely mobile surroundings are going to be studied in our future work.

In addition, during this paper we've assumed that supply and destination area unit truthful in following the established protocol as a result of delivering packets end-to-end is in their interest. Misbehaving supply and destination are going to be pursued in our

future analysis. Moreover, during this paper, as a symptom of idea, we tend to in the main centered on showing the practicability of the projected cypto-primitives and the way second-order statistics of packet loss will be used to boost detection accuracy. As a primary step during this direction, our analysis in the main emphasize

the elemental options of the matter, like the dishonesty nature of the attackers, the general public verifiability of proofs, the privacy-preserving demand for the auditing method, and therefore the randomness of wireless channels and packet losses, however ignore the particular behavior of varied protocols that will be used at completely different layers of the protocol stack. The implementation and optimisation of the projected mechanism underneath numerous specific protocols are going to be thought of in our future studies

we tend to model the wireless channel of every hop on PSD as a random method that alternates between smart and unhealthy states. Packets transmitted throughout the nice state area unit undefeated, and packets transmitted throughout the unhealthy state area unit lost. In distinction to the classical Gilbert-Ellioit (GE) channel model, here we tend to don't assume any Markovian property on the channel behavior. we tend to solely need that the sequence of sojourn times for every state follows a stationary distribution, and therefore the autocorrelation perform of the channel state, say $f_c(i)$, wherever i is that the break in packets, is additionally stationary. Here we tend to limit our study to quasi-static networks, whereby the trail PSD remains unchanged for a comparatively lasting, so the link error statistics of the wireless channel could be a wide-sense stationary (WSS) random method (i.e., $f_c(i)$ is stationary). detection malicious packet drops might not be a priority for extremely mobile networks, as a result of the fast-changing topology of such networks makes route disruption the dominant cause for packet losses. during this case, maintaining stable property between nodes could be a bigger concern than detection malicious nodes. The perform $f_c(i)$ will be calculated victimisation the searching approach in [1]. In brief, a sequence of M packets area unit

transmitted consecutively over the channel. By perceptive whether or not the transmissions area unit undefeated or not, the receiver obtains a realization of the chan-nel state (a_1, \dots, a_M) , wherever a_j two f_0 , oneg for $j = 1, \dots, M$. during this sequence, "1" denotes the packet was with successreceived, and "0" denotes the packet was born. $f_c(i)$ springs by computing the autocorrelation perform of thisdefsample sequence: $f_c(i) = E f_{aj+i} g$ for $i = \text{zero}, \dots, M$, wherever the expectation is calculated over all transmitted packets $j = 1, \dots, M$. This autocorrelation perform describes the correlation between packet transmissions (successful/lost) at completely different times, as a perform of the break. The time invariant nature of f_c is secure by the WSS assumption of the wireless channel. The measuring of $f_c(i)$ will happen on-line or offline. an in depth discussion on however $f_c(i)$ springs is out of the scope of this paper, and that we merely assume that this info is given as input to our detection formula.

There is associate freelance auditor A_d within the network. A_d is freelance within the sense that it's not related to any node in PSD and doesn't have any information of the secrets (e.g., cryptanalytic keys) control by numerous nodes. The audi-tor is accountable for detection malicious nodes on demand. Specifically, we tend to assume S receives feedback from D once D suspects that the route is under fire. Such a suspicion is also

B. Adversarial Model

The goal of the someone is to degrade the network's performance by maliciously dropping packets whereas remaining unseen. we tend to assume that the malicious node has information of the wireless channel, and is alert to the formula used for misconduct detection. it's the liberty to decide on what packets to drop. for instance, within the random-drop mode, the malicious node might drop any packet with atiny low chance P_d . within the selective-mode, the malicious node solely drops packets of sure varieties. a mix of the 2 modes is also used. we tend to assume that any node on PSD will be a malicious node, except the supply and therefore

the destination. above all, there will be multiple malicious nodes on PSD.

We take into account the subsequent sort of collusion between ma-licious nodes: A covert line might exist between any 2 malicious nodes, additionally to the trail connecting them on PSD. As a result, malicious nodes will exchange any info while not being detected by A_d or the other nodes in PSD. Malicious nodes will make the most of this covert channel to cover their misconduct and scale back the prospect of being detected. for instance, associate upstream malicious node might drop a packet on PSD, however might secretly send this packet to a downstream malicious node via the covert channel. once being investigated, the downstream malicious node will offer a symptom of the undefeated reception of the packet. This makes the auditor believe that the packet was with success forwarded to the downstream nodes, associated not apprehend that the packet was really born by an upstream assaulter.

C. drawback Statement

Under the system and someone models outlined higher than, we tend to address the matter of distinctive the nodes on PSD that drop packets maliciously. we tend to need the detection to be performed by a public auditor that doesn't have information of the secrets control by the nodes on PSD. once a malicious node is known, the auditor ought to be ready to construct a publically verifiable proof of the misconduct of that node. the development of such a symptom ought to be privacy conserving, i.e., it doesn't reveal the initial info that's transmitted on PSD. additionally, the detection mechanism ought to incur low communication and storage overheads, so it will be applied to a large kind of wireless networks.

IV. PROJECTED DETECTION THEME

A. Overview

The projected mechanism relies on detection the corre-lations between the lost packets over every hop of the trail. the essential plan is to model the packet loss method of a hop as a random method alternating

between zero (loss) and one (no loss). Specifically, take into account that a sequence of M packets that area unit transmitted consecutively over a wireless channel. By perceptive whether or not the transmissions area unit undefeated or not, the receiver of the hop obtains a electronic image (a_1, \dots, a_M) , wherever a_j two f_0 , oneg for packets $j = 1, \dots, M$. The correlation of the lost packet is calculated because the auto-correlation perform of this electronic image. underneath completely different packet dropping conditions, i.e., link-error vs. malicious dropping, the instantiations of the packet-loss random method ought to gift distinct dropping patterns (represented by the correlation of the instance). this is often true even once the packet loss rate is analogous in every internal representation. To verify this property, in Figure two we've simulated the auto-correlation functions of 2 packet loss processes, one caused by 100 percent link errors, and therefore the alternative by 100 percent link errors and 100 percent malicious uniformly-random packet dropping. It will be ascertained that important gap exists between these 2 auto-correlation functions. Therefore, by scrutiny the auto-correlation perform of the ascertained packet loss method thereupon of a traditional wireless channel (i.e., $f_c(i)$), one will accurately establish the reason behind the packet drops.

The good thing about exploiting the correlation of lost packets will be higher illustrated by examining the insufficiency of the standard methodology that depends solely on the distribution of the quantity of lost packets. a lot of specifically, underneath the standard methodology, malicious-node detection is shapely as a binary hypothesis check, wherever H_0 is that the hypothesis that there's no malicious node in a very given link (all packet losses area unit because of link errors) and H_1 denotes there's a malicious node within the given link (packet losses area unit because of each link errors and malicious drops). Let z be the ascertained variety of lost packets on the link throughout some interval t . Then,

$$\{z = x, \quad \text{underneath } H_0 \quad (\text{no malicious nodes}) \quad (1)$$

$$x + y, \quad \text{underneath } H_1 \quad (\text{there could be a malicious node})$$

where x and y area unit the numbers of lost packets caused by link errors and by malicious drops, severally. each x and y area unit random variables. Let the chance density functions of z conditioned on H_0 and on H_1 be $h_0(z)$ and $h_1(z)$, severally, as shown in Figure 3(a). we tend to have an interest within the maximum-uncertainty state of affairs wherever the a priori possibilities area unit given by $\text{Pr}\{H_0\} = \text{Pr}\{H_1\} = \text{zero}.5$, i.e., the auditor

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we tend to showed that compared with typical detection algorithms that utilize solely the distribution of the quantity of lost packets, exploiting the correlation between lost packets considerably improves the accuracy in detect-ing malicious packet drops. Such improvement is particularly visible once the quantity of maliciously born packets is comparable those caused by link errors. to properly calculate the correlation between lost packets, it's crucial to accumulate truthful packet-loss info at individual nodes. we tend to developed associate HLA-based public auditing design that ensures truthful packet-loss reportage by individual nodes. This design is collusion proof, needs comparatively high procedure capability at the supply node, however incurs low communication and storage overheads over the route. to scale back the computation overhead of the baseline construction, a packet-block-based mechanism was conjointly projected, that permits one to trade detection accuracy for lower computation complexness. Some open problems stay to be explored in our future work. First, the projected mechanisms area unit restricted to static or quasi-static wireless circumstantial networks. Frequent changes on topology and link characteristics haven't been thought of. Extension to extremely mobile surroundings are going to be studied in our future work.

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the established protocol as a result of delivering packets end-to-end is in their interest. Misbehaving supply and destination are going to be pursued in our future analysis. Moreover, during this paper, as a symptom of idea, we tend to in the main centered on showing the practicability of the projected cypto-primitives and the way second-order statistics of packet loss will be used to boost detection accuracy. As a primary step during this direction, our analysis in the main emphasize the elemental options of the matter, like the dishonesty nature of the attackers, the general public verifiability of proofs, the privacy-preserving demand for the auditing method, and therefore the ran-domness of wireless channels and packet losses, however ignore the actual behavior of varied protocols that will be used at completely different layers of the protocol stack. The implementation and optimisation of the projected mechanism underneath numerous specific protocols are going to be thought of in our future studies.

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